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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EL\VOOD BO,Y)L\N,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

[NOR:JIAN D. HAY\VARD], HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDE:JINITY COMPANY, GEORGE
BECKSTEAD, and UN I T E D
STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTEE CO~IPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.

7918

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by defendants Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Company, George Beckstead, and United
States Fidelity and Guarantee Company from the lower
Court's Order awarding a "reasonable attorney's fee"
in the amount of $25 to defendant Beckstead and refusing to award any attorney's fee to defendants Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Company and United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company. Norman Hayward, defendant below, does not appeal and is not a party here.
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Plaintiff filed a joint and several action in the District
Court to recover damages in the mnount of $10,000 and
attorney's fees against four separate defendants for an
alleged assault and battery (Tr. 1, 2). Defendant Hayward was a deputy sheriff of Salt Lake County at the
time of the alleged incident. Defendant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company had issued a Surety Bond
running to George Beckstead, Sheriff, and conditioned
upon the faithful performance of the office of Deputy
Sheriff by defendant Hayward (Tr. ·224). Defendant
Beckstead was Sheriff of Salt Lake County. Defendant
United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company had
issued a Surety Bond running to Salt Lake County and
conditioned upon faithful performance of the office of
Sheriff by defendant Beckstead (Tr. 224). All four defendants answered. Each denied liability and prayed for
a dismissal of the action and for their costs and for
attorney's fees of $1,000.00 pursuant to Section 10444-22 U.C.A. 1943.
The case was tried to a jury which rendered its
verdict against defendant Hayward in his personal
capacity and not as a deputy sheriff and assessed
damages of $150.00 against Hayward (Tr. 195-A). No
verdict was found against defendants Hartford, Beckstead, and U.S.F.&G. who were exonerated (Tr. 195-C).
Th~reupon defendants Hartford, Beckstead, and
U.S.F.&G. each for himself petitioned the Court for
Judgment on the Verdict for attorney's fees as prayed
in their answer and as provided by Sec. 104-44-22, U.C.A.
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19-!3. The Court awarded attorney's fees to defendant
Beckstead in the au10unt of $~5 and refused to award
any attorney's fees to defendants Hartford and
U.S.F.&G. (Tr. ~0:2). Thereafter testimony was taken by
the Court regarding the legal ~ervices rendered to said
defendants by their coun~el in defending the action
(Tr. 7, 8, 9), but no modification, recision or other change
was made in the Court's Order.
(NOTE: Although the record is silent on the award
of $25 as reasonable attorney's fee to defendant Beckstead, such order was made in open Court).

STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN AWARDING TO
DEFENDANT GEORGE BECKSTEAD AS A REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEE THE SUM OF $25.

II.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY
WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR
DEFENDING THE ACTION.

III.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTEE COMPANY WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S
FEE FOR DEFENDING THE ACTION.
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ARGUMENT
Point number II and Point number III will not be
argued separately. Each involves the identical point of
law and will be discussed together under Point II.

I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN AWARDING TO
DEFENDANT GEORGE BECKSTEAD AS A REASON ABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEE THE SUM OF $25.

What is a "reasonable attorney's fee"¥ Obviously,
the term is relative and must vary from time to time
and for place to place. Moreover, the term is not precise
and within its scope many different fees could be set
without violating the qualifying adjective "reasonable."
However, we are not entirely without standards to apply
and the Court below in refusing to apply any of these
standards acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The case
of Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 568, 207
P. (2d) 178 has to do with reasonableness of an attorney's fee as fixed by the Industrial Commissio!l. In
that case counsel petitioned for a re-hearing on an unfavorable decision of the Industrial Commission. When
re-hearing was denied, certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court and upon hearing there the decision of
the Commission was set aside. Then the Commission
awarded benefits of $7,250 to the widow of deceased
and ordered that $375 be paid to counsel for the widow
as compensation for their services, although counsel
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and their client had agreed upon a contingent fee of
$1,000. This award of counsel fees was then brought
before the Suprmne Court on certiorari. Other questions
dealing with constitutionality were raised in the Supreme
Court but the question of the anwunt of a reasonable
attorney's fee was also raised and the Court discussed
at length the factors to be considered in fixing a reasonable attorney's fee:
"In detennining the amount of the fee, it is
proper to consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the acceptance of ernployment in the particular case will preclude the
lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely to
arise out of the transaction, and in which there is
a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would
be employed, or will involve the loss of other
en1ployment while employed in the particular case
or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for similar services;
(4) the amount involved in the controversy and
for the benefits resulting to the client from the
services; ( 5) the contingency or the certainty
of the compensation; and ( 6) the character of
the employment, whether casual or for an established and constant client. No one of these considerations in itself is controlling. They are mere
guides in ascertaining the real value of the service.
"In deterrnining the customary charges of
the Bar for similar services, it is proper for a
lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees
adopted by a Bar Association, but no lawyer
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would permit himself to be controlled thereby
or to follow it as his sole guide in determining
the amount of his fee." Thatcher v. Industrial
Commission, supra.
In the case at bar, counsel were precluded from
testifying as to any contract with their clients as to
amount of the agreed attorney's fee, although an effort
was made so to do. Moreover, the record does not disclose that the agreed fee was contingent upon success.
Counsel were prepared to show both facts. After the
Court's judgment on damages was entered, defendants
petitioned for judgment on the verdict for attorney's
fees in accordance with Section 1.04-44-22 U.C.A. 1943.
This petition was made separately by defendants Beckstead (Tr. 196), Hartford (Tr. 197), and U.S.F.&G. (Tr.
198). The Court denied the petitions of Hartford and
U.S.F.&G. for attorney's fees (Tr. 202). Upon request
of counsel for said defendants some testimony was heard
but the Court never rescinded, modified or re-affirmed
his Order (Tr. 10). Thereafter, counsel moved the court
to reconsider the motion to fix attorney's fees and to
hear additional evidence (Tr. 199, 200, 201). Pursuant
to notice, counsel for both sides appeared before the
Court prepared to present evidence but the Court summarily refused to hear further evidence and denied the
motions (Tr. 204). It is submitted that the Court acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to hear evidence
upon which to base his ruling as to reasonable attorney's
fees. Further, it is submitted that the Court failed to
consider the proper factors in setting the' amount of the
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attorney's fee as is apparent fron1 the award of $25 to
defendant Beckstead and nothing to defendants B:artford
and U.S.F.&G. If an attorney's fee of $375 was unreasonably low in' the Thatcher case and if $1,000 was "within
the range between the highest and lowest reasonableness" it is clear beyond question that $25 for defendant
Beckstead is unreasonably low in this case and that no
attorney's fee at all for defendants Hartford and
U.S.F.&G. is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.
Counsel for defendants have been unable to find a
Utah case squarely in point on the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee under Section 104-44-22. However,
at approximately the same time that this case was heard
by one Judge of the District Court, these counsel were
engaged in defending a similar action against this same
Sheriff and his bonding company before another Judge
of the District Court. (Herrara v. United States Fidelity
and Guarantee Co. et al. Case No. 96489 in the District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah).
In the latter case counsel prepared and filed an answer
and took the deposition of plaintiff. Shortly thereafter
plaintiff moved to dismiss his action which motion was
granted by the Court. Counsel for defendants then
moved the Court to fix a reasonable attorney's fee under
Section 104-44-22. A'fter hearing testimony and argument the Court set $200 as a reasonable attorney's fee,
which amount was paid from the cash undertaking posted
by plaintiff at the commencement of the action. It is
not contended here that this amount is in any way bind-
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ing on another Judge of the same Court nor upon this
Court, but it is recited here by way of contrast. In the
H errara case the matter never even reached the trial
stage; while in the present case counsel conducted a two
day jury trial and achieved an exoneration of their
clients from liability in a law suit for $10,000 and attorney's fees.
Counsel for defendants are both members in good
standing of the Utah State Bar. They maintain law
offices in Salt Lake City and engage in the general practice of law in Utah and elsewhere. Both are members
of the Salt Lake County Bar. Like every practicing
lawyer everywhere, their time, training and skill are
their stock in trade for which they are entitled to reasonable compensation to pay the rent, the stenographer, the
telephone and all the other overhead of a law office, as
well as to pay the grocery bills and rent at home. In this
case the record shows that counsel expended from their
"stock in trade" time and training and skill to:
1.

File an answer for each defendant.

2. File a motion to dismiss as to Hartford
and U.S.F.&G.
3. Appear in Court and argue the motions
to dismiss.
4.

Take the deposition of plaintiff Bowman.

5. Appear and participate in the taking of
the deposition of defendant Hayward and witness
Treseder.
6.

Interview all prospective witnesses.
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7.
dent.

Exan1ine the location of the alleged inci-

S. File a Inotion challenging the undertaking
filed by plain tiff.
9.

Appear in court to argue said motion.

10. Represent defendants
during two days of jury trial.

(successfully)

11. File n1otions for judgment on the verdict.
12.

..A.ppear in court and argue said motions.

It seems patent from this list of activities that any

reasonable person, whether an attorney or not, must
conclude that $25.00 is not a "reasonable" amount to
compensate a firm of attorneys in Salt Lake City, Utah,
A.D. 1952 for services performed in successfully defending their clients in a $10,000 law suit.
The Court's attention is directed to a suggested
minimum fee schedule published in the Utah Bar Bulletin, Vol. XXII, Nos. 1-3, January-March 1952, at page
13 et seq. Paragraph XI of said schedule indicates that
the minimum fee per day in district court varies from
$50 per day to $250 per day. The minimum fee for a
default divorce is $150 (Par. XII) and an appearance
before an administrative commission ranges from $50
to $250 (XX). It is not suggested that said minimum fees
are binding or controlling on the District Judge in setting a "reasonable attorney's fee" but certainly this
schedule furnishes a standard in this County and State.
See: Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, supra..
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II.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COlVIP ANY
WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR
DEFENDING THE ACTION.

III.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTEE COMPANY WAS BY LAW ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S
FEE FOR DEFENDING THE ACTION.

Plaintiff brought his action against each of four
defendants-jointly and severally. He devoted a separate paragraph to each one and alleged liability in
each. And against each one he sought damages of
$10,000.00 and "a reasonable attorney's fee." Summons
was served on each defendant and each was compelled
to answer or to suffer an adverse judgment by default.
Each of the four defendants separately retained counsel
to defend the action. In their answer the four defendants
each prayed for dismissal of the action, for their costs,
and for "$1,000 attorney's fee in accordance with S.ection
104-44-22, Utah Code Annotated 1943" which fee was
less than 10% of the amount for which each defendant
was being sued.
Section 104-44-22, U.C.A.1943 reads:
"In any action brought against any sheriff,
constable, peace officer, state road officer, or any
other person charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws of this state, or service
of civil process, when any such action arises out
of, or in the course of, the performance of his
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duty, or in any action upon the bond of any such
officer, the prevailing party therein shall, in addition to an award of costs a::; otherwise provided
by law, recover fr01n the losing party therein
such sun1 as counsel fees as shall be allowed by
the court. The official bond of any such officer
shall be liable for any such costs and attorney's
fees. Before any such action if filed, and as a condition precedent thereto, the proposed plaintiff
shall prepare and file with, and at the time of
filing, the complaint in any such action, a written
undertaking with at least two sufficient sureties
in an amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned
upon the diligent prosecution of such action, and,
in the event judgment in the said cause shall be
against the plaintiff, for the payment to the defendant of all costs and expenses that may be
awarded against such plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court."
It will be noted:
( 1) That in any action upon the bond of any
sheriff or peace officer the prevailing party "shall
* * * recover from the losing party therein * * *
counsel fees * * * ."

(2) That any plaintiff filing suit against a
sheriff or peace officer must furnish a written
undertaking "and, in the event judgment in the
said cause shall be against the plaintiff [said
undertaking shall stand] for the payment to the
defendant of all costs and expenses that may be
awarded against such plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court."
Surely it cannot be denied that this is an action
"upon the bond" of the sheriff and of his deputy sheriff.
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Nor can it be denied that Hartford and U.S.F.&G. were
"prevailing parties." Therefore, plaintiff Bowman was
the "losing party" as against these defendant-appellants.
Therefore, pursuant to Section 104-44-22, the plaintiff
must pay to defendants "all costs and expenses * * *
including a reas·onable attorney's fee * * * ."
It does not seem necessary to argue that no fee at
all is not a "reasonable attorney's fee."
Suppose, for argument, that the verdict had been
for plaintiff and against all defendants, would not each
defendant have been liable severally not only for damages assessed, but for counsel fees as well1 Plaintiff
prayed for attorney's fees against each defendant under
the statutory authority of Section 104-44-22. Had the
verdict been for him he would have recovered also his
attorney's fees. Therefore, by the authority of the same
statute, since the verdict was against plaintiff and in
favor of Hartford and U.S.F.&G., plaintiff must pay
to these defendants "a reasonable attorney's fee." Each
defendant was compelled to retain counsel to defend
the action filed against him. By law, each, having prevailed in the action, is entitled to recover from plaintiff
his expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee.

CONCLUSION
The Order of the trial court fixing attorney's fees
for appellants should be reversed and set aside as arbitrary and capricious and the cause should be remanded
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with directions to hear evidence and thereafter fix a
reasonable attorney's fee for each appellant. Defendants-appellants should be awarded costs of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

MOSS & HYDE,
Attorneys for Appellants,
430 Judge Building,

Salt Lake City, Utah.
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